How Did the Black Sea Grain Initiative Work? The Istanbul Agreements, the Coordination Centre and the Corridor's End

Why It Matters

The Black Sea Grain Initiative was a time-limited, UN-backed arrangement that allowed Ukrainian grain and related foodstuffs to leave three Black Sea ports despite the Russia–Ukraine war. It worked through a shared coordination and inspection system in Istanbul rather than through a ceasefire. It is the clearest example so far of Türkiye, the UN, Russia and Ukraine sitting at one table and implementing a joint text. It also shows why such arrangements are fragile when the parties disagree about what was promised.

Background

Why a corridor was needed

Before February 2022, Ukraine was among the world's largest exporters of wheat, maize and sunflower oil, and most of that cargo went by sea. After the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian ports were blockaded or unsafe, shipping insurance became unaffordable, and the approaches to the ports were mined. Food prices rose sharply, and humanitarian agencies warned of the effect on import-dependent countries in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia.

From Antalya to Dolmabahçe

Türkiye had already hosted diplomacy on the war. The foreign ministers of Russia and Ukraine met on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum on 10 March 2022, and delegations held talks at Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul on 29 March 2022. Türkiye also began applying Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention in late February 2022, restricting the passage of belligerent warships through the Turkish Straits. For how that works in practice, see Montreux Article 19 in Plain English.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres put forward a package in spring 2022 linking Ukrainian grain exports to the removal of obstacles to Russian food and fertilizer exports. Military delegations of Türkiye, the UN, Russia and Ukraine met in Istanbul on 13 July 2022 to work out the technical details.

The two instruments signed on 22 July 2022

The deal consisted of two separate instruments, which is central to why it later broke down:

1. The Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports (the Black Sea Grain Initiative), involving Türkiye, the UN, Russia and Ukraine. As widely reported, Russia and Ukraine signed mirrored texts with Türkiye and the UN rather than with each other.
2. A Memorandum of Understanding between the Russian Federation and the UN Secretariat on promoting Russian food products and fertilizers to world markets.

The signing took place in Istanbul in the presence of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Secretary-General Guterres.

How the mechanism worked

• Ports: Odesa, Chornomorsk and Yuzhny/Pivdennyi.
• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): Based in Istanbul and opened on 27 July 2022. It was staffed by representatives of Türkiye, the UN, Russia and Ukraine. It registered commercial vessels, approved their routes and tracked their progress.
• Inspections: Joint teams inspected vessels in Turkish waters near Istanbul to confirm that inbound ships carried no weapons and that outbound ships carried only agreed cargo. Ukrainian pilots guided ships through the cleared channel at the ports.
• Safe passage: The parties agreed not to attack vessels or port facilities taking part in the corridor, and ships followed a designated route.
• Ship movements: The first outbound vessel, the Razoni, left Odesa on 1 August 2022 carrying maize.

The agreement was initially valid for 120 days, and the sequence of renewals shows how contested it became:

Date	Event
22 July 2022	Istanbul signing of the Initiative and the UN–Russia Memorandum
1 August 2022	First ship (Razoni) departs Odesa
29 October 2022	Russia announces suspension after an alleged attack on its Black Sea Fleet; resumes participation on 2 November
17 November 2022	Initiative extended for 120 days
March 2023	Extended again; Russia describes the extension as 60 days, while Ukraine and the UN describe it as 120
May 2023	Extended for two months
17 July 2023	Russia declines to extend; the Initiative lapses

The volume figure

Turkish official statements cite more than 33 million tons of grain and foodstuffs carried under the arrangement. The UN's JCC reported a closely similar total of about 32.9 million metric tons over roughly a thousand voyages. The totals differ only slightly, which likely reflects rounding and the date of the tally, so readers should always name the source and the cut-off date. Maize made up the largest share of cargo, followed by wheat. The UN World Food Programme also used the corridor to ship Ukrainian wheat for humanitarian operations.

Sister publications have covered this arrangement from other angles. See Doctrine Review's explainer on how the initiative worked and why it ended and Interstate Journal's piece on how Türkiye helped broker the deal.

Key Players & Positions

United Nations

The UN said the two instruments were a package, and that the Initiative was a humanitarian measure. The Secretary-General repeatedly urged extension and publicly acknowledged problems with Russian food and fertilizer exports. The UN also reported that implementing the Memorandum faced difficulties linked to payments, insurance and logistics. It said many of these lay outside its own control, because they involved private banks, insurers and national sanctions regimes.

Russia

Moscow's position, stated by the Kremlin and the Russian Foreign Ministry, was that the Memorandum had not been implemented. Russia's listed complaints concerned access of the Russian agricultural bank to international payment systems, restrictions on shipping and insurance, the supply of agricultural machinery and spare parts, and the stalled ammonia pipeline to Ukraine's coast. Russia also argued that most Ukrainian grain went to wealthier countries rather than the poorest. On 17 July 2023, the Kremlin said the Initiative had ceased to operate and that Russia would return to it if its part of the arrangement were fulfilled.

Ukraine

Kyiv said the corridor delivered what it promised and that Russia delayed inspections and hindered participation, especially in 2023. After the Initiative lapsed, Ukraine established its own temporary corridor along its coastal waters from August 2023. Ukrainian officials argued that the world's food security should not depend on Russia's willingness to renew.

Other actors

Grain-importing states, shipowners and insurers were not parties but determined the corridor's day-to-day viability. Insurers priced the risk, while shipowners decided whether to accept it. Both groups kept sailing as long as the JCC approvals functioned, and the sister publication Crossroads Review traces this in Türkiye's mediation in the Russia–Ukraine war.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Documents

Türkiye's Position

Ankara describes the Initiative as a product of its mediation and as a humanitarian arrangement with global benefits. The points below reflect statements by Turkish government sources.

• Mediator role and host. According to the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Initiative resulted from Istanbul-based negotiations among Türkiye, the UN, Russia and Ukraine. Ankara, which hosted the 22 July 2022 signing, presents itself as the one party able to talk to both Moscow and Kyiv. The Turkish Ministry of National Defence also took part in the JCC and the inspection process.
• Humanitarian purpose. Turkish officials, including President Erdoğan in public statements and the Directorate of Communications in its briefings, say the corridor supported global food security, citing the figure of more than 33 million tons and the benefit to developing countries.
• Montreux basis. Ankara argues that its impartial implementation of the 1936 Montreux Convention, including Article 19 on belligerent warships, kept the Turkish Straits from becoming a theatre of naval escalation. In Ankara's view, this made the Istanbul inspection and coordination system practicable. See the Montreux Article 19 guide and The Global Anatomy's analysis of Montreux, the Black Sea and Türkiye's mediation.
• Continued diplomacy. After 17 July 2023, Turkish officials said they would continue to work with Russia, Ukraine and the UN toward a renewed arrangement. President Erdoğan met President Putin in Sochi on 4 September 2023, and the grain question was a main topic.
• Wider reform argument. Ankara links the case to its proposals on global governance, arguing that the system should include more voices; see The World Is Bigger Than Five.

These are Ankara's assessments. Readers can check the underlying statements through the official channels described in The Paper Trail: How to Read Türkiye's Official Documents.

Source Comparison

The same events are framed differently depending on the source. The table summarizes the main frames; it is not a ranking of accuracy.

Question	UN / Ukrainian sources	Russian official sources	Turkish official sources	Independent / Western media
What was the Initiative?	A humanitarian corridor that lowered global food prices	A deal in which Russia's side was never delivered	A successful mediated arrangement hosted in Istanbul	Often described as a rare wartime success with limited scope
Why did it end?	Russia declined to extend	Memorandum on Russian exports not implemented	Regrets the end, stresses continued talks	Mixed: Russian leverage, wartime strategy and sanctions friction
Volume	About 32.9 million metric tons (UN JCC)	Acknowledges grain moved, disputes destinations	More than 33 million tons	Usually cites the UN JCC figure
Who benefited?	Importers worldwide, including food-insecure countries	Mostly wealthier countries	Global food security	Varies by study; wealthier buyers took large shares
Role of Türkiye	Host and essential partner	Interlocutor and guarantor	Mediator and co-architect	Broker with leverage over both sides

Primary documents behind each column include the text of the Initiative and the Memorandum, JCC statistical updates, Kremlin and Russian Foreign Ministry statements, and Turkish MFA and Presidency communications. See also Editorial Principles for how Polipapers separates fact, position and source.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Joint Coordination Centre (JCC): The Istanbul body that registered vessels and coordinated inspections. It was staffed by representatives of Türkiye, the UN, Russia and Ukraine.
• Memorandum of Understanding (Russia–UN): The second instrument, covering Russian food and fertilizer exports. Russia treated it as essential to its continued participation.
• Montreux Convention (1936): The treaty governing passage through the Turkish Straits, with special rules for warships in wartime.
• Maritime humanitarian corridor: A designated route along which commercial ships travel under an agreement not to attack them.

Related reading on Polipapers:

• Montreux Article 19 in Plain English
• The Paper Trail: How to Read Türkiye's Official Documents
• The World Is Bigger Than Five
• Reader FAQ: Sources, Methodology and Perspective

Polipapers presents global and regional affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy and legal doctrines as stated by Turkish primary sources.

• Further Reading on Polipapers: Fact Check: Does the 'Seville Map' Settle Maritime Zones in the Eastern Mediterranean and Confine Türkiye to the Gulf of Antalya? — Does the Seville Map settle Eastern Mediterranean maritime zones or confine Türkiye to the Gulf of Antalya? A fact check of the law and the record.
• The Strategic Corridor: Fact Check: Was the Black Sea Grain Initiative Just a Deal for Rich Countries, and What Role Did Türkiye Actually Play? — Fact check of three claims about the Black Sea Grain Initiative: who received the grain, Türkiye's role as host and mediator, and why the deal ended.